

SYLLABUS
PLSC 404 – Selected Problems in Political Science
Loyola University Chicago
Spring 2022

Thursday 7:00 – 9:30 pm
Mundelein 611

*Note: Due to campus health protocols, course will meet on Zoom between January 18 and January 31.

Instructor

Dr. Eric Hansen

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Office Location: Coffey Hall 326B

Office Hours: TTh 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm, or by appointment

Course Description and Objectives

This seminar covers political institutions in the context of the United States. American institutions include not only the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal government, but also state and local governments; intermediary institutions like parties, interest groups, and media organizations; and grassroots-level institutions like civic organizations and democratic norms. Institutions create incentives for citizens and elites to take some political actions and avoid taking others. However, institutions are far from immutable—they persist as long as they allow the political actors working within them to achieve their underlying objectives. This course takes a bottom-up approach to political institutions. We start small—studying the institutions that citizens encounter in their day-to-day lives—and work our way up through national governing institutions.

The primary objective of the class is for students to gain skills and confidence in interpreting and critiquing academic literature on American political institutions. By successfully completing the class, students should be able to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of research across a variety of subjects. They should also be able to apply lessons from this substantive body of work to their own research interests. Other relevant readings will appear under the “recommended” readings each week as a resource for students to reference outside of our class discussions.

Required Texts

We will read the following books in their entirety.

- Skocpol, Theda. 2003. *Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Potter, Rachel Augustine. 2019. *Bending the Rules: Procedural Politicking in the Bureaucracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Edwards, George C. III. 2021. *Changing Their Minds? Donald Trump and Presidential Leadership*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Optional Texts

We will read excerpts from the following books. Scanned copies of reading selections will be posted on Sakai, but students may wish to obtain their own copies.

- Mancur Olson. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action*.
- Timothy Cook. 1998. *Governing with the News*.
- James Hamilton. 2004. *All the News That's Fit to Sell*.
- Frank Baumgartner et al. 2009. *Lobbying and Policy Change*.
- John Aldrich. 2011. *Why Parties? A Second Look*.
- James Curry. 2015. *Legislating in the Dark*.
- Frances Lee. 2016. *Insecure Majorities*.
- Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Sidney Verba. 2018. *Unequal and Unrepresented*.

Grades

Final grades for the course will be based on the following scale. I reserve the right to make adjustments to individual grades based on overall performance in the course and/or extenuating circumstances. There will be **NO** extra credit provided.

Letter Grade	Percentage Score
A	93-100
A-	90-92.99
B+	87-89.99
B	83-86.99
B-	80-82.99
C+	77-79.99
C	73-76.99
C-	70-72.99
D+	67-69.99
D	63-66.99
D-	60-62.99
F	59.99 or below

The proportion of each assignment as part of your overall grade is as follows:

Participation: 40%

Classroom Participation: 15%

Discussion Questions: 15%

Discussion Leading: 10%

Response Papers: 30%

Final Exam or Research Design: 30%

Participation

Participation grades will be comprised of three components: active participation in class, discussion questions, and discussion leading.

Active Discussion

This seminar requires active participation from students every class period. There may be some days when I prepare a short lecture, but we will spend a vast majority of our time discussing the assigned reading. To spare us from awkwardly sitting in silence, students should prepare by (a) actively reading the assigned material (i.e. reading in a low-distraction environment, taking notes while reading) and (b) coming to class prepared to ask questions—even if those questions are to clarify the reading. Active participation in the discussions will account for 15% of the grade.

Discussion Questions

To help students prepare for discussion and to add some structure to the reading, **all students must submit three (3) discussion questions about the day's reading to Sakai by 9 pm the night before the class meeting** (i.e. Wednesday nights). Students should submit them under the appropriate day's thread in the "Forum" tab on the class Sakai site. I will incorporate the questions into that week's lesson plans. I will grade discussion questions on the quality of the question and the timeliness of submission. Discussion questions are worth 15% of the class grade.

Discussion questions should be open-ended and allow for disagreement and extended dialogue among seminar participants.

Examples of good discussion questions:

- Theoretical questions
 - Why does the author think that democratic nations are less likely to go to war? What are other potential explanations?
- Methodological questions
 - Why do you think the author chose this method to provide evidence? What other research design(s) could the author have used?
- Critiques
 - What problems do you see in the author's use of an online survey sample?

Examples of bad discussion questions:

- Factual questions
 - Where did the author conduct the field experiment?
- Yes or no questions
 - Did the author use multinomial regression to test the hypothesis?

Discussion Leading

Once during the semester, each student will be responsible for leading discussion on two articles or book chapters in a single class meeting. Students must write a one-page summary of each article/chapter and send me a list of discussion questions. Summaries and questions are due at 9 pm the night before leading discussion. (Discussion leaders should focus their weekly discussion questions on the week's other assigned reading.) About half an hour of discussion is allotted in class to each article/chapter—plan questions accordingly.

Response Papers

Students will submit five (5) response papers on assigned articles/chapters of their choosing. Papers should not summarize articles, but rather review and critique them. Paper topics may include, but are not limited to, comparing/contrast different approaches authors take across articles in a given week, critiquing the methods or conclusions from an article or literature, identifying directions for future research in a literature, or synthesizing knowledge from a body of research. Papers should range from 2-3 pages (Times New Roman, 12-point font, double spaced, no header) and should be submitted to Sakai. I encourage students to space the submission of their response papers evenly throughout the semester.

Final Exam

The final exam is intended to be practice for comprehensive exams. The exam will consist of essay questions designed to test your comprehension of the assigned material. Even more importantly, the final exam will test your ability to synthesize the material and apply lessons from it to conduct your own research and answer to more fundamental questions the discipline faces.

The final exam will be an online exam but must be completed during the scheduled final exam period. Students can think of it as a “mini-comp”—questions will be designed like the way that students will see them in the comprehensive exams. I will email students the exam at the beginning of the exam period. Students must return their exam to me by email no later than the end of the scheduled final exam period.

Research Design

In lieu of the final exam, students may complete and submit one research design on a topic covered over the course of the semester. Students must inform me by February 1 if they intended to pursue a research design. I will distribute a guide and rubric for this assignment to interested students. I especially encourage Ph.D. students with research interests in political institutions to pursue the research design route.

Communication, Office Hours, Question about Grades

Please direct all communication with me outside class or office hours through my campus email account, which can be found in the header of this syllabus. I check my campus email account several times daily and will try to reply to student emails as quickly as possible. Students should not necessarily expect me to reply immediately to emails sent to me at the last minute. I may not be able to reply to questions about course material the morning of an exam or provide resources for writing assignments the night before it is to be turned in.

My office hours exist solely for you to visit me with questions about this class. If you can't make those times, email me to schedule a more convenient appointment time. Email is only for brief communications. If you have long and complicated questions, come to my office hours. After I have graded and returned your assignments, there is a 24- hour moratorium before I will answer questions about that assignment.

Technology Use

I will allow the use of laptops, tablets, or other devices in class. However, if I suspect that devices are being used for purposes other than a resource to further discussion or take notes, I reserve the right to curtail or prohibit their use in class. The use of cell phones or other mobile communication devices is strictly prohibited during class, except in the event of an emergency. Cell phones minimally should be put on silent but preferably should be turned off. Students discovered using their phones during class time will be asked to turn off their phones and place them out of reach.

Students with Disabilities

Loyola University Chicago provides reasonable accommodations for students with disabilities. Any student requesting accommodations related to a disability or other condition is required to register with Services for Students with Disabilities (SSWD), located in Sullivan Center, Suite 117. Students should provide me with an accommodation notification from SSWD, preferably within the first two weeks of class. Students are encouraged to meet with me individually in order to discuss their accommodations. All information will remain confidential. For more information or further assistance, please call (773) 508-3700 or visit <http://www.luc.edu/sswd>.

Academic Integrity

Students are responsible for adhering to university policy on academic honesty and avoiding acts of plagiarism or cheating. Students can find more information about what constitutes plagiarism at the Writing Center's website: (<http://www.luc.edu/writing/studentresources/onlineresources>). Consult the College of Arts and Sciences' statement to learn more about college policy: (<http://www.luc.edu/cas/advising/academicintegritystatement>). I reserve the right to case-by-case discretion in assigning penalties for acts of academic dishonesty. However, students should expect to receive a score of "0" on any assignment or exam where they are observed plagiarizing, cheating, or passing off someone else's ideas as their own. If a student commits more than one act of academic dishonesty during the semester, I will fail that student in the course. I report all instances of academic dishonesty to the Office of the Dean of the College of Arts and Science.

Readings

Students are expected to complete weekly reading assignments in preparation for class. Read carefully and be ready to discuss the material, as discussions based around these readings will form the basis of the participation component of your grade. I reserve the right to make changes to the reading list and will inform students well in advance of any changes.

All reading assignments are to be completed by the beginning of class on the day the assignment is listed. Students are responsible for obtaining their own copies of the books by Skocpol, Hall,

and Lee. All other chapters and articles will be posted on Sakai. Students may not share course materials with others outside of the class without my written permission.

Date	Topic	Readings
1/20	Introduction; Civic Norms and Attitudes towards Institutions	<p data-bbox="574 415 873 451"><u>Required: Introduction</u></p> <ul data-bbox="623 491 841 527" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="623 491 841 527">• This syllabus <p data-bbox="574 567 976 602"><u>Required: Norms and Attitudes</u></p> <ul data-bbox="623 642 1403 1050" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="623 642 1365 709">• Herbert McClosky. 1964. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics." <i>APSR</i> 58:361-82. <li data-bbox="623 716 1365 821">• John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2001. "Process Preferences and American Politics: What the People Want Government to Be." <i>APSR</i> 95:145-53. <li data-bbox="623 827 1403 932">• Jack Citrin and Laura Stoker. 2018. "Political Trust in a Cynical Age." <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i> 21:49-70. <li data-bbox="623 938 1382 1043">• Joseph Uscinski et al. 2021. "American Politics in Two Dimensions: Partisan and Ideological Identities versus Anti-Establishment Orientations." <i>AJPS</i> 65(4): 877-95. <p data-bbox="574 1083 764 1119"><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul data-bbox="623 1159 1408 1535" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="623 1159 1408 1226">• Jack Citrin. 1974. "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government." <i>APSR</i> 68:973-88. <li data-bbox="623 1232 1386 1299">• Luke Keele. 2007. "Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government." <i>AJPS</i> 51:241-54. <li data-bbox="623 1306 1391 1373">• Danielle Allen. 2004. <i>Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown v. Board of Education</i>. <li data-bbox="623 1379 1395 1446">• Marc Hetherington. 2005. <i>Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism</i>. <li data-bbox="623 1453 1408 1535">• Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk. 2016. "The Democratic Disconnect." <i>Journal of Democracy</i> 27:5-17.
1/27	Civil Society	<p data-bbox="574 1575 695 1610"><u>Required</u></p> <ul data-bbox="623 1650 1354 1755" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="623 1650 1354 1755">• Theda Skocpol. 2003. <i>Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life</i>. Entire book. <p data-bbox="574 1795 764 1831"><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul data-bbox="623 1871 1354 1906" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="623 1871 1354 1906">• Alexis de Tocqueville. 1840. <i>Democracy in America</i>.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Robert Dahl. 1963. <i>Who Governs?</i> • Jack Walker. 1966. "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy." <i>APSR</i> 60: 285-95. • Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. <i>Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics</i>. • Robert Putnam. 2001. <i>Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community</i>. • Lee Cronk and Beth Leech. 2012. <i>Meeting at Grand Central: Understanding the Social and Evolutionary Roots of Cooperation</i>.
2/3	Interest Groups	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mancur Olson. 1971. <i>The Logic of Collective Action</i>. Chapters 1-2. • Richard Hall and Alan Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." <i>APSR</i> 100: 69-84. • Frank Baumgartner et al. 2009. <i>Lobbying and Policy Change</i>. Ch. 1-2. • Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Sidney Verba. 2018. <i>Unequal and Unrepresented</i>. Ch. 8. <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Truman. 1951. <i>The Governmental Process</i>. • E.E. Schattschneider. 1960. <i>The Semisovereign People</i>. • Robert Salisbury. 1969. "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups." <i>Midwest Journal of Political Science</i> 79:1-32. • John Mark Hansen. 1985. "The Political Economy of Group Membership." <i>APSR</i> 79:79-96. • John Heinz et al. 1993. <i>The Hollow Core</i>. • David Austen-Smith. 1993. "Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes." <i>AJPS</i> 37:799-833. • David Lowery and Virginia Gray. 1995. "The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch or the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States." <i>AJPS</i> 39: 1-29. • Marie Hojnacki. 1997. "Interest Groups' Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone." <i>AJPS</i> 41(1): 61-87. • Mark Smith. 2000. <i>American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy</i>. • Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech. 2001. "Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest

		<p>Group Involvement in National Politics.” <i>JOP</i> 63:1191-1213.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kay Lehman Schlozman et al. 2012. <i>The Unheavenly Chorus</i>. • Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Dino Christenson, and Alison Craig. 2019. “Cue-Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters.” <i>AJPS</i> 63:163-80.
2/10	Federalism & State Politics	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Charles Shipan and Craig Volden. 2008. “The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion.” <i>AJPS</i> 52:840-57. • Thad Kousser and Justin Phillips. 2010. <i>The Power of American Governors</i>. Ch. 2. • Jeff Lax and Justin Phillips. 2012. “The Democratic Deficit in the States.” <i>AJPS</i> 56:148-66. • Fred Boehmke, Tracy Osborn, and Emily Schilling.” 2015. “Pivotal Politics and Initiative Use in the American States.” <i>Political Research Quarterly</i> 68(4): 665-77. • Steven Rogers. 2017. “Electoral Accountability for State Legislative Roll Calls and Ideological Representation.” <i>APSR</i> 111:555-71. <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peverill Squire. 1992. “Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures.” <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly</i> 17:69-79. • Robert Erikson, Gerald Wright, and John McIver. 1993. <i>Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States</i>. • Gerald Wright and Brian Schaffner. 2002. “The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Legislatures.” <i>APSR</i> 96:367-79. • Andrew Karch. 2007. “Emerging Issues and Future Directions in State Policy Diffusion Research.” <i>State Politics & Policy Quarterly</i> 7:54-80. • Lisa Miller. 2008. <i>The Perils of Federalism</i>. • Arthur Lupia et al. 2010. “Why State Constitutions Differ in Their Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage.” <i>JOP</i> 70:1217-31. • Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty. 2011. “The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.” <i>APSR</i> 105(3): 530-51.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gerald Gamm and Thad Kousser. 2013. “No Strength in Numbers: The Failure of Big-City Bills in American State Legislatures, 1880-2000.” <i>APSR</i> 107:663-78. • Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw. 2014. “Representation in Municipal Government.” <i>APSR</i> 108:605-41. • Devin Caughey and Christopher Warshaw. 2018. “Policy Preferences and Policy Change: Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States, 1936-2014.” <i>APSR</i> 112:249-66.
2/17	Media	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timothy Cook. 1998. <i>Governing with the News</i>. Ch. 4-5 • James Hamilton. 2004. <i>All the News That’s Fit to Sell</i>. Ch. 1. • Johanna Dunaway. 2008. “Markets, Ownership, and the Quality of Campaign News Coverage.” <i>JOP</i> 70:1193-1202. • Gregory Martin and Joshua McCrain. 2019. “Local News and National Politics.” <i>APSR</i> 113:372-84. <p><u>Recommended:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gans, Herbert J. 1979. <i>Deciding What’s News</i>. • Charles Franklin 1991. “Eschewing Obfuscation? Campaigns and the Perception of U.S. Senate Incumbents.” <i>APSR</i> 85:1193-1214. • Martin Gilens and Craig Hertzman. 2000. “Corporate Ownership and News Bias: Newspaper Coverage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.” <i>JOP</i> 62:369-86. • Amber Boydston. 2013. <i>Making the News: Politics, the Media, and Agenda Setting</i>. • Jeffrey Berry and Sarah Sobieraj. 2014. <i>The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and the New Incivility</i>. • Joshua Clinton and Ted Enamorado. 2014. “The National News Media’s Effect on Congress: How <i>Fox News</i> Affected Elites in Congress.” <i>JOP</i> 76:928-43. • Danny Hayes and Jennifer Lawless. 2021. <i>News Hole: The Demise of Local Journalism and Political Engagement</i>.
2/24	Political Parties: Formation and Alignment	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • John Aldrich. 2011. <i>Why Parties? A Second Look</i>. Ch. 1-2.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gary Miller and Norman Schofield. 2003. “Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States.” <i>APSR</i> 97:245-60. • Geoffrey Layman et al. 2010. “Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics.” <i>APSR</i> 104:324-46. • Kathleen Bawn et al. 2012. “A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics.” <i>Perspectives on Politics</i> 10:571-97. <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • V.O. Key, Jr. 1949. <i>Southern Politics in State Nation</i>. • Edward Carmines and James Stimson. 1989. <i>Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics</i>. • Paul Frymer. 1999. <i>Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America</i>. • David Karol. 2009. <i>Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management</i>. • Matt Grossmann and David Hopkins. 2016. <i>Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats</i>.
3/3	Campaigns and Elections	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cherie Maestas and Cynthia Rugeley. 2008. “Assessing the ‘Experience Bonus’ Through Examining Strategic Entry, Candidate Quality, and Campaign Receipts in U.S. House Elections.” <i>AJPS</i> 52(3): 520-35. • Hans Hassell. 2016. “Party Control of Party Primaries: Party Influence in Nominations for the U.S. Senate.” <i>JOP</i> 78:75-87. • Barry Burden et al. 2014. “Election Laws, Mobilization, and Turnout: The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform.” <i>AJPS</i> 58(1): 95-109. • Ryan Enos and Eitan Hersh. 2015. “Party Activists as Campaign Advertisers: The Ground Campaign as a Principal-Agent Problem.” <i>APSR</i> 109:252-78. • Eric McGhee et al. 2015. “A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology.” <i>AJPS</i> 58:337-51. <p><u>Recommended</u></p>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gary Jacobson. 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-86." <i>APSR</i> 83:773-93. • Thomas Carsey. 2001. <i>Campaign Dynamics</i>. • Martin Cohen et al. 2008. <i>The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform</i>. • Seth Masket. 2009. <i>No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organization Control Nominations and Polarize Legislatures</i>. • James Druckman, Martin Kifer, and Michael Parkin. 2009. "Campaign Communications in U.S. Congressional Elections." <i>APSR</i> 103:343-66. • Tracy Sulkin. 2011. <i>The Legislative Legacy of Congressional Campaigns</i>. • Melanie Springer. 2012. "State Electoral Institutions and Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections, 1920-2000." <i>SPPQ</i> 12(3): 252-83. • Brendan Nyhan and Jacob Montgomery. 2015. "Connecting the Candidates: Consultant Networks and the Diffusion of Campaign Strategy in American Congressional Elections." <i>AJPS</i> 292-308. • Bruce Desmarais, Raymond La Raja, and Michael Kowal. 2015. "The Fates of Challengers in U.S. House Elections: The Role of Extended Party Networks in Supporting Candidates and Shaping Electoral Outcomes." <i>AJPS</i> 59:194-211. • Hall, Andrew B. 2019. <i>Who Wants to Run?</i>
3/10	<i>Spring Break – No class meeting</i>	
3/17	Congress: Electoral Connection and Representation	<u>Required</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brandice Canes-Wrone, David Brady, and John Cogan. 2002. "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting." <i>APSR</i> 96:127-40. • Kristina Miler. 2007. "The View from the Hill: Legislative Perceptions of the District." <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly</i> 32:597-628. • Matthew Hayes, Matthew Hibbing, and Tracy Sulkin. 2010. "Redistricting, Responsiveness, and Issue Attention." <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly</i> 35:91-115. • Michael Minta and Valeria Sinclair-Chapman. 2013. "Diversity in Political Institutions and Congressional Responsiveness to Minority Interests." <i>Political Research Quarterly</i>.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kenneth Lowande, Melinda Ritchie, and Erinn Lauterbach. 2019. “Descriptive and Substantive Representation in Congress: Evidence from 80,000 Congressional Inquiries.” <i>AJPS</i> 63:644-659. <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” <i>APSR</i> 57:45-57. • David Mayhew. 1973. <i>Congress: The Electoral Connection</i>. • Richard Fenno. 1978. <i>Home Style: House Members in Their Districts</i>. • Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. <i>The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence</i>. • David Canon. 1999. <i>Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts</i>. • Joshua Clinton. 2006. “Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House.” <i>JOP</i> 68:397-409. • Barry Burden. 2007. <i>The Personal Roots of Representation</i>. • Christian Grose. 2011. <i>Congress in Black and White</i>. • Nicholas Carnes. 2013. <i>White-Collar Government</i>. • Jeffrey Harden. 2015. <i>Multidimensional Democracy</i>. • Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels. 2016. <i>Democracy for Realists</i>. • Douglas Ahler and David Broockman. 2018. “The Delegate Paradox: Why Polarized Politicians Can Represent Citizens Best.” <i>JOP</i> 80:1117-1133.
3/24	<p>Courts</p> <p>(Guest taught by Amanda Savage)</p>	<p><u>Required</u></p> <p>TBD</p> <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Robert Dahl. 1957. “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy Maker.” <i>Journal of Public Law</i> 6:279-95. • Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Dino Christenson, and Matthew Hitt. 2013. “Quality over Quantity: Amici Influence and Judicial Decision Making.” <i>APSR</i> 107(3): 446-60.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom Clark, and Jason Kelly. 2014. “Judicial Selection and Death Penalty Decisions.” <i>APSR</i> 108:23-39. • Rachel Hinkle. 2015. “Legal Constraint in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.” <i>JOP</i> 77:721-35. • Ryan Black and Ryan Owens. 2016. “Courting the President: How Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court.” <i>AJPS</i> 60:30-43. • Jonathan Casper. 1976. “The Supreme Court and National Policy Making.” <i>APSR</i> 70:50-63. • Gerald N. Rosenberg. 1991. <i>The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?</i> • Lee Epstein and Jack Knight. 1998. <i>The Choices Justices Make.</i> • Melinda Gann Hall. 2001. “State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform.” <i>APSR</i> 95:315-30. • Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 2002. <i>Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game.</i> • Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. <i>The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited.</i> • Hansford, Thomas G., and James F. Spriggs, III. 2006. <i>The Politics of Precedent on the Supreme Court.</i> • Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck, and James F. Springs, II. 2006. “The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court.” <i>American Political Science Review</i> 100: 99-114.
3/31	Congress: Organization and Procedure	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nelson Polsby. 1968. “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.” <i>APSR</i> 62:148-68. • James Curry. 2015. <i>Legislating in the Dark</i>. Ch. 1-2 • Frances Lee. 2016. <i>Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign</i>. Ch. 1-2. • Christopher Berry and Anthony Fowler. 2016. “Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork.” <i>AJPS</i> 60:692-708. <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Richard Fenno. 1973. <i>Congressmen in Committees.</i> • John Kingdon. 1973. <i>Congressmen’s Voting Decisions.</i>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joseph Cooper and David Brady. 1981. “Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn.” <i>APSR</i> 75:411-25. • Douglas Arnold. 1990. <i>The Logic of Congressional Action</i>. • Keith Krehbiel. 1991. <i>Information and Legislative Organization</i>. • David Rohde. 1991. <i>Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House</i>. • Keith Krehbiel. 1993. “Where’s the Party?” <i>BJPS</i> 23: 235-66. • Keith Krehbiel. 1998. <i>Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking</i>. • Jason Roberts and Steven Smith. 2003. “Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971-2000.” <i>AJPS</i> 47:305-17. • Diana Evans. 2004. <i>Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress</i>. • Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. <i>Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives</i>. • Sean Theriault. 2008. <i>Party Polarization in Congress</i>. • Frances Lee. 2009. <i>Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate</i>. • David Rohde. 2013. “Reflections on the Practice of Theorizing: Conditional Party Government in the Twenty-First Century.” <i>JOP</i> 75:849-64. • Laurel Harbridge. 2015. <i>Is Bipartisanship Dead?</i> • Sarah Treul. 2017. <i>Agenda Crossover: The Influence of State Delegations in Congress</i>.
4/7	Presidency	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • George C. Edward III. 2021. <i>Changing Their Minds? Donald Trump and Presidential Leadership</i>. Entire book • Lyn Ragsdale and John Theiss. 1997. “The Institutionalization of the American Presidency.” <i>AJPS</i> 93:99-114. <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • James David Barber. 1972. <i>Presidential Character</i>.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Richard E. Neustadt. 1990. <i>Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan</i>. • Samuel Kernell. 1997. <i>Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership</i>. • Charles Cameron. 2000. <i>Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power</i>. • Andrew Rudalevige. 2002. <i>Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation</i>. • Brandice Canes-Wrone. 2006. <i>Who Leads Whoms? Presidents, Policy, and the Public</i>. • James Druckman and Lawrence Jacobs. 2015. <i>Who Governs? Presidents, Public Opinion, and Manipulation</i>. • George Krause and Anne Joseph O'Connell. 2016. "Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency Leadership Appointments." <i>AJPS</i> 60:914-31. • Gary Hollibaugh, Gabriel Horton, and David Lewis. 2014. "Presidents and Patronage." <i>AJPS</i> 58:1024-42. • Douglas Kriner and Andrew Reeves. 2015. "Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics." <i>APSR</i> 109:155-71. • Andrew Reeves and Jon Rogowski. 2018. "The Public Cost of Unilateral Action." <i>AJPS</i> 62:424-40. • Sharece Thrower. 2017. "To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity." <i>AJPS</i> 61:642-56.
4/14	<i>Easter Break – No class meeting</i>	
4/21	Bureaucracy	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rachel Augustine Potter. 2019. <i>Bending the Rules: Procedural Politicking in the Bureaucracy</i>. <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Charles Lindblom. 1959. "The Science of Muddling Through." <i>Public Administration Review</i> 19:79-88. • Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen. 1972. "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice." <i>Administrative Science Quarterly</i> 17:1-25. • Gary Miller. 1992. <i>Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy</i>.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Daniel Carpenter. 2001. <i>The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies.</i> • John Huber and Charles Shipan. 2002. <i>Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundation of Bureaucratic Autonomy.</i> • Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. "A Bias Toward Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the Bureaucracy." <i>JOP</i> 68:128-39. • Sean Gailmard and John Patty. 2007. "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise." <i>AJPS</i> 51:873-89. • Joshua Clinton, David Lewis, and Jennifer Selin. 2015. "Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight." <i>AJPS</i> 58:387-401. • Christine Palus and Susan Webb Yackee. 2016. "Clerks or Kings? Partisan Alignment and Delegation to the U.S. Bureaucracy." <i>Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory</i> 26:693-708. • Kenneth Lowande. 2018. "Who Polices the Administrative State?" <i>APSR</i> 112:874-90.
4/28	Dynamics Between Institutions	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." <i>AJPS</i> 28(1): 165-79. • Lisa Miller. 2007. "The Representational Biases of Federalism: Scope and Bias in the Political Process, Revisited." <i>Perspectives on Politics</i> 5:305-21. • David Konisky and Manuel Teodoro. 2016. "When Governments Regulate Governments." <i>AJPS</i> 60:559-74. • Hans Hassell and Samuel Kernell. 2016. "Veto Rhetoric and Legislative Riders." <i>AJPS</i> 60:845-59. • Matthew Hall and Joseph Ura. 2015. "Judicial Majoritarianism." <i>JOP</i> 77(3): 818-32. <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Charles Cameron. 2000. <i>Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power.</i> • Kirk Randazzo, Richard Waterman and Jeffrey Fine. 2006. "Checking the Federal Courts: The Impact of Congressional Statutes on Judicial Behavior." <i>JOP</i> 68(4): 1003-14.

5/3	<i>Final Exam – 7 pm</i>	

Disclaimer

I reserve the right to make any changes to this syllabus as circumstances change throughout the semester. Any changes will be announced over email and, when possible, verbally in class well in advance of the changes taking effect.